Do Individual Investors Drive Post-Earnings Announcement Drift? Direct Evidence from Personal Trades by David Hirshleifer et al.
 
 
 Do individual investors drive post-earnings announcement drift? 
 







James N. Myers** 
Linda A. Myers** 
Siew Hong Teoh* 
   
 
 
*Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University 













We thank Allen Poteshman, Terry Shevlin, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Sheridan Titman, 
and seminar participants at Ohio State University, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, University of Michigan, University of Maryland, Pennsylvania State 




Do individual investors drive post-earnings announcement drift? 






This study examines whether individual investors are the source of post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD).  We provide evidence on how individual investors trade in 
response to extreme quarterly earnings surprises and on the relation between individual 
investors’ trades and subsequent abnormal returns.  We find no evidence that either 
individuals or any sub-category of individuals in our sample cause PEAD.  Individuals 
are significant net buyers after both negative and positive earnings surprises.  There is no 
indication that trading by any of our investor sub-categories explains the concentration of 
drift at subsequent earnings announcement dates.  While post-announcement individual 
net buying is a significant negative predictor of stock returns over the next three quarters, 
individual investor trading fails to subsume any of the power of extreme earnings 



















I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  This paper examines whether post-earnings announcement drift, or PEAD (Foster, et al. 
1984; Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990), results from trades made by individual investors.  
PEAD is the tendency for stocks to earn high positive average abnormal returns in the three 
quarters subsequent to extreme positive earnings surprises, and, more strongly, to earn negative 
average abnormal returns in the three quarters subsequent to extreme negative earnings surprises, 
where an earnings surprise is calculated as the difference between the current quarter’s earnings-
per-share and split-adjusted earnings-per-share four quarters prior.   
Bernard and Thomas (1990) suggest that PEAD is due to investors naively forecasting earnings.
1  
Furthermore, recent studies suggest that PEAD may result from the trading activity of individual 
investors.
 These studies are motivated by a literature that argues that individual investors are less 
sophisticated than institutional investors, and that the trading of individual investors is the 
sources of market inefficiencies (e.g., Hand 1990; Lee et al. 1991; Grinblatt and Keloharju 
2000).
2  One such study, Bartov et al. (2000), finds that PEAD is strongest in firms with low 
institutional shareholdings.
3  Furthermore, Bhattacharya (2001) provides evidence that the 
volume of small trades but not large trades is associated with the magnitude of random walk 
                                                 
1 Papers that examine the serial correlation of earnings and returns in greater detail have concluded that this 
evidence is consistent with less naiveté than is suggested by Bernard and Thomas (1990) (Ball and Bartov 1996) or 
with no naiveté (Soffer and Lys 1999; Jacob et al. 2000) about the time series of earnings. Our purpose here is not to 
estimate investor perceptions about the time-series process for earnings. Rather, we examine whether the trading 
pattern of individual investors is consistent with predicted behavior under the hypothesis that trading by individual 
investors drives PEAD 
2 Although evidence suggests that individual investors make poor investment decisions on average (Barber and 
Odean 2000), there is also evidence that some individuals possess superior investment skills (Coval et al. 2003).    
3 However, results from tests of whether the level of institutional shareholdings is a good proxy for investor 
sophistication are mixed. Because of this, the authors indicate that their results do not provide strong evidence about 
whether individual investors cause PEAD.    2
 
 
earnings surprises, suggesting that investors who make small trades may underlie the PEAD 
phenomenon. 
In this paper, we offer more direct tests of the hypothesis that individual investors cause 
PEAD by examining individual investor trading following earnings announcements.  Using a 
database that includes all trades made by a sample of individual investors through a major 
discount brokerage firm from 1991 through 1996 inclusive, we examine whether individuals as a 
group, or relevant sub-categories, tend to make contrarian trades in opposition to the direction of 
earnings surprises.  To the extent that individual trades can impede a full price response, their 
trading would intensify PEAD.  In addition, we examine whether individual trading with respect 
to earnings announcements can subsume some of the explanatory power of earnings in predicting 
subsequent abnormal returns.    
Past empirical work on trading in response to earnings announcements shows that 
earnings announcements stimulate trading volume.
4  In general, public news announcements can 
generate trading volume both by resolving uncertainty, thereby creating consensus and triggering 
‘unwinding’ trades, and by providing information which generates disagreement and results in 
the taking of speculative positions. Investors who have differing information prior to a news 
announcement or who have different information-processing abilities may interpret earnings 
news differently, and may therefore trade differently in response (Karpoff 1986; Demski and 
Feltham 1994; Kim and Verrecchia 1994, 1997).   
Most past empirical studies have focused on unsigned volume, and any identification of 
traders is inferred from the size of the trade.  However, in order to examine whether trading by 
                                                 
4 Several studies show that the effect of accounting disclosure on volume is related to the size of the earnings 
surprise (e.g., Bamber 1986, 1987; Ziebart 1990; Kross et al. 1994), to firm size (e.g., Bamber 1986; Ziebart 1990; 
Atiase and Bamber 1994; Bhattacharya 2001), and to the degree of information asymmetry prior to the information 
release (e.g., Ziebart 1990; Ajinkya et al. 1991; Atiase and Bamber 1994; Utama and Cready 1997).      3
 
 
individual investors causes PEAD, it is useful to determine whether they are trading in the same 
direction as the earnings surprise  (net buying after good news and net selling after bad news) or 
in opposition to it.  Our database allows us to make this determination. 
   In a related paper, Lee (1992) examines the inferred-signed trades of investors in relation 
to earnings news.  Measuring the sign of the earnings surprise relative to the most recent Value 
Line earnings forecast, he finds that small trades tend to be inferred-buys for more than two days 
after both favorable and unfavorable earnings surprises.  Lee assumes that it is individual 
investors who are making these small trades and he suggests that his findings are consistent with 
earnings announcements drawing the attention of individual investors to the stock.  Our study 
differs from Lee’s in that we examine only extreme earnings surprises (which are the source of 
the drift), directly identify individual traders rather than use the size of the trade as a proxy for 
whether the trader is an individual or an institution, and directly identify the direction of the trade 
(i.e., whether the trade is a buy or sell) rather than use the price relative to the bid-ask spread as a 
proxy for whether the trade was initiated by a buyer or seller.  
We build on previous literature by examining more specifically the buying and selling 
behavior of individual investors around extreme earnings surprises.  We thereby provide a 
focused examination of whether the trades made by individual investors explain PEAD.  
Furthermore, we apply two proxies for individual investor sophistication (capital invested and 
trading experience) to determine whether the least sophisticated investors (those with relatively 
little capital invested with the discount broker and/or those with relatively little trading 




If drift reflects market misvaluation, then more sophisticated investors should buy before 
upward drift (to obtain high returns), and sell before downward drift (to avoid low returns).  
Thus, sophisticated investors should buy after positive earnings surprises and sell after negative 
earnings surprises.  In order for markets to clear, naïve investors must be taking the opposite side 
of these transactions, buying after unfavorable earnings surprises and selling after favorable 
earnings surprises.  In other words, the rational optimism (pessimism) and buying (selling) 
pressure of sophisticated investors after favorable (adverse) earnings news is met by irrational 
pessimism (optimism) and selling (buying) pressure on the part of naïve investors. 
Trading patterns such as these can be a source of market underreaction to earnings news.  
In this scenario, the increased supply of shares offered by naïve individuals after favorable 
earnings news will, in equilibrium, tend to moderate the resulting price increase, resulting in 
prices that are inefficiently low.
5  Prices will on average tend to be corrected upward over the 
ensuing months, causing positive PEAD.  Similarly, in this scenario, the increased demand for 
shares by naïve investors after unfavorable earnings news will, in equilibrium, tend to moderate 
the resulting price decline, causing negative PEAD.  A more detailed discussion of this 
hypothesis is provided in section II. 
This reasoning suggests a simple set of tests of whether individual investors cause post-
earnings announcement drift.  If individual investors are naïve with respect to earnings suprises, 
we expect to see significant net buying after negative earnings surprises, and significant net 
selling after positive earnings surprises.  In contrast, if individual investors are attempting to 
                                                 
5Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) provide models in which 
PEAD can arise as an underreaction to earnings.  There is debate in the empirical literature about whether PEAD 
reflects a rational risk premium; a simple tendency for investors to underreact to earnings news; or a more complex 
intertemporal pattern of short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction to earnings (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1994; Dechow and Sloan, 1997; Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Daniel and Titman, 2001).  5
 
 
arbitrage away PEAD in a sophisticated fashion, we expect to see the opposite pattern.  
Furthermore, given the evidence that downside PEAD is much stronger than upside PEAD, the 
tendency of individuals to buy after negative surprises should be stronger than the tendency of 
individuals to sell after positive surprises.   
Stronger tests involve the relation between individual trading and subsequent stock 
returns. The hypothesis that individuals drive PEAD predicts that individual net sells, which 
generate underpricing, should predict high subsequent stock returns, and individual net buys, 
which generate overpricing, should predict low subsequent returns.  If individual trading is a 
source of the relation between earnings surprise and subsequent returns, then the predictive 
power of individual trades should remain even after controlling for the earnings surprise.  
Finally, individual trading after earnings surprises should subsume part or all of the ability of the 
earnings surprise to predict subsequent returns.  
  The literature on PEAD also provides evidence that a disproportionate amount of drift is 
concentrated around the three subsequent quarterly earnings announcements (Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989; 1990).  If  PEAD represents mispricing, then sophisticated investors can exploit 
this pattern.  Specifically, when there is a positive earnings surprise, investors should buy shares 
a few days prior to each of the next three quarterly earnings announcements and partly unwind 
these positions in the days after these announcements.  When there is a negative earnings 
surprise, they should do the reverse.  Such sophisticated trading, if unopposed by the trades of 
naïve investors, would accelerate the adjustment of prices and eliminate the concentration of 
PEAD at the subsequent earnings announcement dates.  For the concentration of drift to exist 
despite arbitrage by sophisticated investors, naïve investors must be trading in the opposite 
direction, impeding the rapid adjustment of prices.  Thus, if individual investors are naïve, after a  6
 
 
favorable (unfavorable) earnings announcement they will sell (buy) just prior to each of the 
subsequent earnings announcements. We discuss the reasoning behind this prediction in more 
detail in section II.   
Our results indicate that individual investors do not cause post earnings announcement 
drift.  We bring three kinds of evidence to bear on this issue.  First, we test whether individuals 
trade in a contrarian fashion in response to extreme earnings surprises.  As discussed in section 
II, if individual trading caused PEAD, investors would be net purchasers after good news and net 
sellers after bad news.  This would reduce the amount by which prices react to earnings news, 
resulting in underreaction.  In fact, in our sample individuals are significant net purchasers after 
both good and bad news, and this conclusion holds in different investor categories that differ in 
sophistication.  
Second, we test whether net purchases made by individual investors can subsume the 
ability of the extreme earnings surprise to predict subsequent abnormal stock returns.  We 
examine the relation between ranked net purchases (RANK NET PURCHASES) immediately 
following extreme earnings surprises and subsequent abnormal stock market returns and find 
that, on average, the stocks that individuals net sell following extreme earnings announcements 
outperform the stock that individuals net purchase following extreme earnings announcements.  
Although this effect is potentially consistent with individual trades pushing share prices away 
from fundamental values, it is statistically unrelated to PEAD.  In fact, we find that controlling 
for RANK NET PURCHASES does not diminish at all the ability of extreme earnings surprise to 
predict subsequent returns.   
Third, we measure the extent to which, conditional on an earnings surprise at a given 
date, individual investors make abnormal trades in the days just prior to or after subsequent  7
 
 
quarterly earnings announcements.  Our findings are not consistent with the trading pattern 
predicted by the hypothesis that individual investor trading causes the concentration of PEAD at 
the three subsequent earnings announcement dates. 
Thus, our evidence opposes the proposition that individual investors cause PEAD.  
However, it is consistent with trading by individuals being influenced by an earnings attention 
effect.
6  That is, the greater the absolute value of the earnings surprise, the greater the volume 
bought and sold, but the direction of the news is unrelated to the direction of the trading.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section II explains how trading by 
individual investors could induce PEAD.  Section III contains a description of the data and 
sample selection criteria, variable definitions, and descriptive statistics.  Section IV provides 
evidence on individual investor trading in relation to earnings surprises.  In Section V we 
examine the relation between individual trading, earnings surprises, and subsequent stock 
returns.  Section VI examines individual trading, conditional on an earnings surprise, near the 
dates of subsequent quarterly earnings announcements. and Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  NAÏVE TRADING AND POST-EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT 
Several papers suggest that the trading behavior of individual investors may be the source of 
PEAD.  Prior research consistently suggests that drift is associated with high individual 
shareholding and trading (e.g., Bartov et al. 2000, Bhattacharya 2001).  However, if trading by 
individuals causes PEAD, then their trading must be naïve in a way that systematically causes 
prices to underreact to earnings news.  Before discussing what trading behavior would cause 
PEAD, we review the PEAD phenomenon.   
                                                 
6 For an analysis of the effects of media-reported general news announcements on investor trading, see Barber and 
Odean (2001).  8
 
 
PEAD is typically characterized as an underreaction to earnings news.  Bernard and 
Thomas (1990) show that seasonal random walk quarterly earnings changes are positively 
serially correlated.  That is, after a positive earnings surprise, subsequent earnings surprises tend 
to be predictably positive, while after a negative earnings surprise, subsequent earnings surprises 
tend to be predictably negative.  Furthermore, stock returns around subsequent earnings 
announcements tend to be predictable.  Specifically, while stock prices generally increase 
(decrease) after good (bad) news, they do not seem to increase (decrease) enough.  In fact, they 
continue to rise (fall) following the subsequent three quarterly earnings announcements.  Bernard 
and Thomas (1989) suggest that this happens because investors react naively to earnings 
announcements by failing to recognize the serial correlation in earnings surprises.  
A group of investors that drives PEAD would trade in a way that opposes a full and 
rational stock price adjustment in response to earnings surprises.  Thus, after favorable earnings 
news, when price rises, such individuals would, on average, sell the stock, while after bad news, 
such individuals would, on average, buy.  In other words, such individuals would be contrarian 
with respect to current earnings news.  This suggests a simple set of tests of whether individual 
investors cause post-earnings announcement drift – if individuals cause PEAD then they will 
tend to net buy after negative earnings surprises and net sell after positive earnings surprises.   
Furthermore, if trading by individuals causes share prices to underreact to earnings news 
(which manifests as PEAD), then their net purchases must be related to subsequent abnormal 
stock returns.  Therefore, the hypothesis that individuals drive PEAD predicts that individual net 
selling, which generates underpricing, should predict high subsequent stock returns, and 
individual net buying, which generates overpricing, should predict low subsequent stock returns.  
Moreover, if trading by individual investors is a source of the relation between extreme earnings  9
 
 
surprises and subsequent returns, then the predictive power of individual trades should remain 
even after controlling for the magnitude of the earnings surprise.  Finally, individual trading after 
earnings surprises should subsume part or all of the ability of the earnings surprise to predict 
subsequent returns.    
  There is also evidence from past literature that stock return drift is disproportionately 
concentrated around the three subsequent quarterly earnings announcements (Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989; 1990).  If PEAD represents a market inefficiency, this presents sophisticated 
investors with an opportunity to exploit this pattern using a dynamic trading strategy.  For 
example, after a positive earnings surprise an investor can earn high returns by buying shares a 
few days prior to each of the next three quarterly earnings announcements, and partly unwinding 
these positions in the days after these announcements.   
  Such a strategy offers a favorable balance between risk and expected return.  While risk 
that is related to earnings announcements is greater at the time of the earnings announcements, 
the expected return is also greater around subsequent earnings announcements.  Concentrating 
trades near the time of earnings announcements reduces extraneous risk that is unrelated to these 
announcements.  Note also that even investors who do not trade actively to exploit drift can, in 
the quarters after a favorable earnings surprise, benefit by advancing any planned purchase from 
a few days after to a few days before a subsequent earnings announcement, and by deferring any 
planned sale from a few days before to a few days after a subsequent earnings announcement. 
  When there is a negative earnings surprise, investors should do the reverse, selling just 
before subsequent earnings announcements.  In either case, sophisticated trading tends to 
accelerate the adjustment of prices.  If unopposed by the trades of naïve investors, such arbitrage 
would eliminate the concentration of PEAD at the subsequent earnings announcement dates.  In  10
 
 
equilibrium, the concentration of drift can persist despite the trading of sophisticated investors,  
if naïve investors trade in the opposite direction, further delaying price adjustment.  Thus, if 
individual investors are naïve, conditional on a favorable (unfavorable) earnings announcement 
they will sell (buy) just prior to each of the subsequent earnings announcements. 
  In this account, naïve traders delay price adjustment, but this is of course not the purpose 
of their trades.  Rather, after a favorable earnings announcement naïve traders differ from 
sophisticated investors in their beliefs about fundamental value.  Sophisticated investors believe 
that  price is too low, and their purchases drive the price higher.  Naïve traders, in contrast, 
believe that the price has moved up too much, and therefore tend to sell.  (If they did not have 
such a belief, they would have no reason to sell, and there would be no underreaction at the 
original earnings announcement date.)  Just as a sophisticated trader thinks he is getting a good 
deal buying a security right before a subsequent earnings announcement, a naïve trader thinks he 
is getting a good deal selling the security at that time.   
  It could be argued on prior conceptual grounds that drift could not represent a market 
inefficiency because if naïve trading were to induce such a pattern of mispricing, smart 
arbitrageurs would find it profitable to trade to exploit it.  Such exploitation would tend to 
attenuate the pattern.  However, a literature in behavioral finance and accounting has argued that 
despite arbitrage by sophisticated investors, the behavior of imperfectly rational investors can 
induce mispricing (including PEAD), and under some circumstances, mispricing can persist.
7  If 
naive investors are subject to common misperceptions, then in the aggregate, these 
misperceptions may be substantial enough to influence price.  (Given such commonality, we 
would also expect to see evidence of such misperceptions within our sample of individual 
                                                 
7See, for example, the models and surveys of DeLong et al. (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Daniel et al. (1998), 
Fischer and Verrecchia (1999), Hirshleifer (2001), and Lee (2001).    11
 
 
investors if individual investors are driving PEAD.)  Furthermore, if sophisticated investors are 
risk averse, the degree to which they arbitrage mispricing may be limited.  As discussed earlier, 
there is also empirical evidence suggesting that the trading of unsophisticated individual 
investors influences prices.  
Empirically, several authors have concluded that PEAD represents a market inefficiency 
(see, for example, Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990).  We do not take a stand on this issue.  We 
merely argue that, given existing theory and evidence, the hypothesis that PEAD is a market 
inefficiency resulting from individual investor trading deserves to be tested. 
 
III.  TRANSACTION DATA, SAMPLE SELECTION, VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, 
AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Transaction Data 
The data used in this study comes from a large discount broker.  It includes trades made 
by 78,000 households, using that broker.  The broker made 3,075,797 trades on behalf of these 
households between January 1991 and December 1996 inclusive.  1,969,747 of these trades 
involve common stock, while the remainder involves mutual fund shares, bonds, and other 
securities.  We classify the households as actively-trading investors (6,000 households), high-
capital investors (12,000 households), and general investors (60,000 households).
8  Any investor 
that conducts more than 48 trades in a year is classified as actively-trading; investors that are not 
classified as actively-trading and that have more than $100,000 of invested wealth at any time 
are classified as high-capital investors; and all remaining investors are classified as general 
investors. 
                                                 
8 We follow the broker’s classification scheme when grouping investors.  However, the broker refers to the high-
capital investors as affluent.  We change this label so that it more accurately reflects the criterion.  12
 
 
The high-capital and actively-trading investor classifications measure two aspects of 
investing experience – the amount of wealth invested and the frequency of trades.  We use these 
two aspects of investing experience to proxy for investor sophistication.  With respect to the 
amount of wealth invested, an investor who has a greater amount of wealth invested and who 
intends to trade frequently in the stock market has a greater incentive to invest resources learning 
about stock trading.
9  Furthermore, greater invested wealth may be associated with past stock 
market success.  With respect to the frequency of trades, investors may learn through experience 
about the time series property of earnings and about market price patterns.  This suggests that 
more sophisticated individual investors may be better at avoiding errors in trading in response to 
earnings announcements, or may even be good at exploiting PEAD. 
 
Sample Selection And Variable Definitions 
Our sample consists of all firm-quarters with sufficient Compustat data with at least one 
trade made during the following 13 months by our sample of investors.
10  From Compustat, we 
require primary earnings per share before extraordinary items (quarterly data item 19) at both 
quarter t and quarter t-4, price per share at the end of quarter t (quarterly data item 14), and the 
corresponding split adjustment factors (quarterly data item 17).  Additionally, we require an 
earnings announcement date and the number of shares outstanding at the end of the quarter 
(quarterly data item 61).  Using the Compustat data, we construct the standardized unexpected 
                                                 
9 Consistent with this, Cready (1988) finds evidence consistent with wealthy institutional investors trade more 
quickly in response to earnings announcements, suggesting that the value of information increases with wealth.  
10 This sample selection criteria is much less strict than that used by Lee (1992) or Bhattacharya (2001).  In these 
studies, firms must have an average of at least 10 trades per day over the prior year to be included in the sample.  
Because our data represents only a small subset of the total number of trades, imposing this criterion would reduce 
the sample size by more than 95 percent.  However, imposing this criterion (an average of at least 10 shares traded 
per day) does not materially affect the main results of our study.  13
 
 
earnings (SUE) as the seasonal difference in split-adjusted earnings per share scaled by the split-
adjusted end of quarter price (i.e., the price at the end of the quarter prior to the earnings 
announcement).  We define SUE 1 firms as the 10 percent of firms with the most negative 
random walk earnings surprise, SUE 10 firms as the 10 percent of firms with the most positive 
random walk earnings surprise, and SUE 5 and 6 firms as the 20 percent of firms with the 
smallest (in absolute value) random walk earnings surprise.  
For each firm-quarter, we identify all trades of the firm’s common stock made by our 
sample of investors during the following quarter.  We measure the trading activity over various 
event windows, ranging in length from one day to a whole quarter.  For example, we measure the 
trading activity on the earnings announcement day for quarter q, for firm j, by summing the 
number of common shares of firm j traded by any investor in the dataset on the earnings 
announcement day.  We scale this sum by the number of common shares outstanding for firm j at 
the end of quarter q.  We repeat this procedure for subsamples of trades (i.e., for buys and sells) 
and for subsamples of investors (i.e., for high-capital investors, actively-trading investors, and 
general investors).  We measure net purchases as the difference between the number of shares 
purchased and the number of shares sold in the event window, scaled by millions of shares 
outstanding at quarter-end.
11 
  A challenge for calculating abnormal trading activity is that the normal trading 
benchmark for individual firms is difficult to identify because, as we discuss later, earnings 
surprises seem to affect the frequency of trading over long periods.  Therefore, we compare how 
individual investors trade the shares of firms with extreme earnings surprises with how they trade 
                                                 
11 When the number of shares purchased exceeds the number of shares sold in the event window, net purchases is 
positive.  When the number of shares sold exceeds the number of shares purchased in the event window, net 
purchases is negative.    14
 
 
the shares of firms with little or no earnings surprise.  That is, we consider individual trades in 
the shares of firms in SUE 5 and 6 as the benchmark, and test how the trades of shares of firms in 
SUE 1 and of firms in SUE 10 differ from this benchmark. 
  Since prior literature has found PEAD to be stronger in small firms (Foster et al. 1984; 
Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990), we also partition the firms based on their market value of 
equity at quarter end.  Using alternative size measures, we verify that these findings hold when 
only small firms are considered.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Our final sample consists of 941,210 trades made in the 13 months following 65,703 
earnings announcements.  54 percent of these trades are buys, with a mean number of shares 
purchased of 512, and 46 percent of these trades are sells, with a mean number of shares sold of 
594.
12  Although 76.9 percent of the investors are classified as general investors, these investors 
make only 40 percent of the trades, and the 15.4 percent of the sample that is classified as high-
capital investors make only 11.4 percent of the trades.  The remaining 48.6 percent of the trades 
are made by the 7.7 percent of the sample that is classified as actively-trading investors.   
  Further descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.  Panel A of Table 1 describes the 
distribution of trade size of both buys and sells by year.  It is interesting to note the large number 
of large trades in the database.  For example, the trade size is greater than $5,000 for 
approximately half of the trades and at least 500 shares are traded in more than 25 percent of the 
trades.  Since prior studies use either the number of shares traded or the dollar value of the 
transaction to classify trades as being initiated by individuals or institutions, prior studies would 
                                                 
12 Table 1 descriptive statistics differ slightly from these because the Table 1 sample includes all trades of common 
stock and the Table 1 sample is not restricted to trades of firms with available Compustat data.  15
 
 
classify these large trades as either institutional trades or as indeterminate.  The wide variation in 
the frequency of trading among individuals is also of interest.  Panel B shows that while the 
median individual trades 4 times per year for a total of approximately $21,000, the median 
actively-trading investor trades 22 times a year for approximately $158,000.  It is also interesting 
to note how highly skewed the trading volume (measured in dollar value and number of trades) 
is.  For example, the mean trading volume, measured in dollars per year, is greater than the third 
quintile indicating that there are a few very large trades.  Finally, actively-trading investors trade, 
on average, 6 times as often and 10 times as much (in dollar value) as general investors, and 
more than 4 times as often and more than 5 times as much (in dollar value) as high-capital 
investors.  Because the actively-trading investors are indeed highly active, it is plausible that 
these investors may be disproportionately important in generating the empirically observed price 
patterns.  On the other hand, these traders may be more sophisticated than other individual 
investors, suggesting that they are not the source of PEAD.  
Put Table 1 about here. 
 
IV.  INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR TRADING FOLLOWING EXTREME EARNINGS 
SURPRISES 
 
In this section, we discuss the trades made by individual investors following extreme 
earnings surprises.  Furthermore, we describe the trading behavior of the three investor groups: 
General Investors, High-Capital Investors, and Actively-Trading Investors. 
 
Trading by Individual Investors Following Extreme Earnings Surprises 
The hypothesis that individuals cause post-earnings announcement drift suggests that 
individuals will buy after extremely bad earnings news (pushing the stock price up) and sell after  16
 
 
extremely good earnings news (pushing the stock price down).  As described previously, in the 
first set of tests, we examine the trades made by individual investors following extreme earnings 
surprises (SUE 1 firms and SUE 10 firms) and compare these to the trades made by individual 
investors following earnings announcements with little or no surprise (SUE 5 and 6).   
Figure 1 reveals that in the 25 trading days following an extreme earnings announcement, 
cumulative abnormal net purchases made by individual investors are greater on average for SUE 
1 (bad news) firms than for SUE 10 (good news) firms.
13  However, two aspects of this evidence 
sharply contradict the proposition that individual investors cause PEAD.  First, individuals are 
net purchasers after both good news and bad news.  This confirms the finding in Lee (1992) for 
extreme earnings news, and confirms directly that this effect is due to individual investors.  This 
net buying by individuals in SUE 10 firms during the 16 days following an extreme earnings 
surprise is inconsistent with the hypothesis that individual investor trade against favorable 
earnings news, causing underreaction and subsequent drift.  Second, the difference in cumulative 
net purchases between good news and bad news firms does not develop until 17 days (i.e., more 
than three weeks) after the earnings announcement so differences in individual trading cannot 
explain any under- or overreaction in the days following the earnings announcement.  
Put Figure 1 about here. 
Table 2 provides numerical statistics that confirm the pattern in Figure 1.  Panel A (B), 
reports differences in mean number of shares traded (buys, sells, and net purchases) per million 
shares outstanding between extreme good news (bad news) firms and no news firms.  In the first 
15 days following an extreme earnings surprise, there is statistically significant buying and 
                                                 
13 Cumulative net purchases is the sum of shares purchased minus the sum of shares sold beginning on the day 
following the earnings announcement and ending on day t, scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the end of 
the quarter for which earnings is announced.  Cumulative abnormal net purchases is the difference between 
cumulative net purchases for SUE 1 (SUE 10) firms and cumulative net purchases for SUE 5 and SUE 6 firms.  17
 
 
selling for both good and bad news firms (relative to no news firms).  Note that the significant 
net purchases following good news contradict the hypothesis that individuals are causing PEAD.   
In fact, the only aspect of the evidence suggesting that individuals may contribute to drift 
is that net purchases are larger, more significant, and more persistent following bad news.  
Indeed, following good news, there is insignificant net selling beginning 16 trading days (i.e., 
more than three weeks) after the earnings announcement.  However, the difference between the 
net purchases following good vs. bad news is not significant in the first three weeks of trading 
following an earnings announcement.
14  Overall, this evidence suggests that individuals are 
influenced by an earnings attention effect, but there is no indication that individuals 
systematically engage in the earnings-contrarian form of trading that would induce underreaction 
and so cause PEAD. 
 
Trading by Individual Investors Following Extreme Earnings Surprises in Small Firms  
Prior literature finds that PEAD is more prevalent in small firms (Foster et al. 1984; 
Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990).  Since individual investors tend to be disproportionate holders 
of the shares of small firms, several authors have suggested that smaller firms are more likely to 
have a less sophisticated shareholder base (Lee et al. 1991; Potter 1992; Walther 1997).  To test 
whether individuals investing in small firms are causing PEAD, we examine how investors trade 
following extreme earnings surprises at small firms.  Table 3 replicates the analysis from table 2 
for firms with market value of equity less than the median in the sample.  That is, we classify 
                                                 
14 In an efficient market, prices react immediately so if individual investors were driving underreaction, they would 
need to trade in opposition to the earnings surprise from the first days after the announcement.   18
 
 
firms as small or large based on their market value of equity (MVE) at the end of the fiscal 
quarter and define firms with MVE less than the median as small firms.
15 
Put Table 3 about here. 
 
Since investors in the dataset tend to invest in large firms, the sample size is reduced by 
approximately two-thirds.  The statistical power is therefore reduced but the results of this 
analysis are largely consistent with those using the entire sample.  Although individuals sell 
more shares following good news than in the benchmark case of no-news, they also sell more 
shares following good news.  Resulting net purchases (buys – sells) is not significantly different 
for good news vs. no news firms.  Furthermore, the signs on net purchases are consistent that 
using the full sample (i.e., they support an attention effect) but net purchases is not significantly 
different from zero in three of four windows.  Thus, even in small firms, where PEAD is 
strongest, there is no evidence that individuals cause PEAD. 
   
Trading by Individual Investor Class   
Even if individual investors as an aggregate do not drive drift, there could be important 
trading effects concentrated in particular classes of investors.  The activities of naïve individual 
investors could be masked in the aggregate by arbitrage on the part of more sophisticated 
individual investors trading to profit from PEAD.  We therefore examine specifically those 
investor classes that are most likely to be either less or more sophisticated.  As discussed 
previously, there is reason to believe that investors with more capital invested and more 
experienced traders may be more sophisticated in their processing of information.  Therefore, we 
                                                 
15 We also replicate this analysis using the bottom decile of MVE as our measure of small firms and find essentially 
identical results.  However, the sample size is reduced to approximately 900 firms and the statistical power is 
significantly reduced.   19
 
 
expect high-capital investors and actively-trading investors to be more sophisticated, on average, 
than general investors.  We test whether the least sophisticated individuals – general investors – 
drive PEAD and whether high-capital investors and actively-trading investors trade in a way that 
masks the effect in aggregate.  Panel A (Panel B) of table 4 tests whether net purchases are 
significantly different for extreme good news (bad news) and non-news earnings announcements 
for the three classes of investors (high-capital investors, actively-trading investors, and general 
investors).   
Put Table 4 about here. 
Contrary to our expectations, we find no evidence that the general investors drive PEAD.  
Trading by general investors does, however, support the earnings attention effect in that these 
investors are net purchasers after both good and bad earning news.  Furthermore, we find no 
evidence that more experienced or high capital individual investors exploit PEAD.  While high-
capital investors are net sellers following good news (an earnings-contrarian behavior), these 
results are insignificant.  Finally, trading by actively-trading investors strongly supports an 
earning attention effect, but these investors do not appear either to cause or to take advantage of 
PEAD.   
As a further test, in results not reported here we partition investors into three classes 
based on the gender and marital status of the head of the household.
16  The first class, female, 
consists of all households in which a female is reported as the head of the household, regardless 
of marital status.
17  The second and third classes, married male and single male respectively, are 
                                                 
16 The partitioning variables used in this section are self-reported by the individual investors.  A large number of 
accounts in the database have no information about gender and / or marital status.  These accounts are omitted for 
this portion of the analysis. 
17 The small number of female head of households precludes a further partition into married and unmarried.  20
 
 
composed of accounts that report married and single male head of households respectively.    In 
brief,  there is no clear indication that any of the classes are systematically driving PEAD at 
subsequent earnings announcements. 
 
In summary, the evidence on individual investor trading does not support the hypothesis 
that individuals or any class thereof are trading in a manner that would cause PEAD. 
 
V.  INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR TRADING AS A PREDICTOR OF POST-
EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT 
 
As discussed in section II, if trading by individual investors causes PEAD, then their net 
trading should negatively predict subsequent stock market returns.  Furthermore, net trading by 
individuals should subsume part or all of the explanatory power of the earnings surprise for 
predicting subsequent abnormal stock returns.  In this section, we examine the relation between 
individual investor trading and subsequent market-adjusted returns for the sample of investors as 
a whole and for the individual investor classes described previously. 
   
Trading by Individual Investors and Subsequent Returns 
Previous studies (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 1989; 1990) find that PEAD is strongest 
among firms with relatively extreme earnings surprises.  This suggests that we may be able to 
increase the power of our tests by focusing on firms with relatively extreme earnings surprises.  
This filters out the noise from firms with modest SUEs and little PEAD. On the other hand, when 
we restrict the sample to those firms with the most extreme SUEs (e.g., to those firms in deciles 
1 and 10), most of the data is excluded.  As a compromise, we restrict the sample for the  21
 
 
subsequent analyses to those 11,480 firms in SUE deciles 1 to 3 or 8 to 10 
18 and to those firms 
with non-zero net buys in the 5 days following the earnings announcement.
19  
Table 5 reports the results of regressions of returns (measured over the 9 and 6 months 
subsequent to the earnings announcement) on SUE (the decile rank of the earnings surprise) both 
with and without controlling for past momentum.  To control for market-to-book and size, we 
add the decile rank of the firm’s market-to-book ratio (MTB) and the decile rank of the firm’s 
market value of equity (MVE) as regressors.  We measure momentum as the market-adjusted 
buy and hold returns over the 6 months prior to the earnings announcement date.   
The coefficients on SUE are strongly significant.  This confirms that after controlling for 
size, market-to-book, and past momentum, the PEAD effect was strong during the time period.  
Thus, this time period is appropriate for testing whether individual investor trading drives PEAD. 
We next examine the effect of including the decile rank for net buying of the firm 
(RANK NET PURCHASES) in the regression.  Specifically, RANK NET PURCHASES is the 
decile rank based on the number of shares purchased minus the number of shares sold from day 
+1 to day +5 relative to the earnings announcement date, scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is announced.  Table 5 reveals that 
individual investor trading in the five days following extreme earnings announcements (RANK 
NET PURCHASES) is a significant negative predictor of future 6-month and 9-month stock 
returns, and that this effect is independent of the size and market-to-book effects.   
                                                 
18 When we run our analyses on firms in deciles 1 and 10 of SUE, the coefficients have the same sign but are 
insignificant because the small sample size reduces the power of our tests.  Using SUE deciles 1 to 2 and 9 to 10 or 
including firms in all SUE deciles provides results similar to those reported.  
19 Including those firms with zero net-buys provides almost identical results.  22
 
 
The talent that individual investors show for picking losers in their post-earnings 
announcement trades certainly raises a suspicion that they may be the source of PEAD.  
However, Table 5 shows that the PEAD effect is not subsumed by individual investor trading.  
The coefficient on SUE remains highly significant (p<.0001) after RANK NET PURCHASES is 
included in the regression.  
One could argue that only a subset of individual investors drive PEAD; if so, including 
investors outside of this subset adds noise to our analyses.  In this case, we may not expect 
RANK NET PURCHASES to subsume SUE completely.  However, including RANK NET 
PURCHASES in the regression does not detract at all from the magnitude and significance of 
the SUE effect.  This evidence strongly contradicts the hypothesis that trading by individual 
investors as a group is a source of the PEAD effect.   
Even after controlling for SUE, RANK NET PURCHASES remains statistically 
significant.  Indeed, the coefficients on RANK NET PURCHASES from regressions that include 
SUE are larger and more significant than those from regressions (not reported) that do not 
include SUE.  Thus, individual investors have a special “skill” at picking losers, conditional on 
an extreme earnings surprise.
20   
In summary, these analyses reveal that individual investors trade foolishly in response to 
extreme earnings surprises in the sense that their trades in the 5 days following these surprises 
are negative predictors of returns over the next 6 to 9 months.  This anti-arbitrage by individual 
investors suggests that they may be the driving force behind some kind of market inefficiency, 
perhaps losing money when the market misvaluation is corrected.  However, this individual 
trading effect appears to be unrelated to PEAD.  There is no indication from the returns evidence 
                                                 
20 This is consistent with evidence, not conditioned on earnings surprises, that individual investor trades on average 
underperform (Odean 1999; Barber and Odean 2000).  23
 
 
that individual investors drive PEAD.  Nor is there any indication that PEAD underlies this 
individual investor trading effect.  
 
Trading by Classes of Individual Investors and Future Returns 
The results in the previous section rule out the hypothesis that the trades of the 
individuals in our sample as a group are the source of drift.  However, it remains possible that 
some unsophisticated class of individual investors drives PEAD, and that this is being masked by 
sophisticated trades in the opposite direction made by another subset of individual investors.  
Thus, to explore further whether a class of individuals drives PEAD, we report similar returns 
regressions for each of the investor classes in table 6.  Analyses by class reduces the sample size, 
so statistical significance is generally lower.  However, all regressors other than RANK NET 
PURCHASES remain significant in the 9-month return window, and while the coefficients on 
RANK NET PURCHASES are insignificant for the affluent class, they remain negative.   
The significance and magnitude of the coefficients on RANK NET PURCHASES 
increase from high-capital investors to general investors to actively-trading investors.  This 
suggests that high-capital investors are less ‘skilled’ at picking losers following extreme earnings 
surprises, that ranked net purchases made by general investors following extreme earnings 
surprises are stronger predictors of negative future returns, and that this effect is strongest for 
actively-trading investors.  The key finding, however, is that for all classes of individual 
investors, adding RANK NET PURCHASES to the regression has virtually no effect on the 
coefficient or significance of SUE.  That is, SUE remains strongly significantly positive in all 
specifications, and SUE is not subsumed by the trading of high-capital investors, actively-trading  24
 
 
investors, or general investors.  This evidence strongly opposes the hypothesis that trading by 
any of these investor classes drives PEAD. 
 
VI. TRADING IN SHORT WINDOWS AROUND  
SUBSEQUENT EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
The hypothesis that individual investors are the source of PEAD predicts that individual 
investors are net sellers after initial favorable earnings surprises, and more strongly are net 
purchasers after initial unfavorable earnings surprises. As discussed in Section II, if the drift 
represents genuine mispricing, then sophisticated investors, who understand that drift is 
particularly intense near the dates of subsequent earnings announcements, should also time their 
trades with respect to the subsequent announcements.  Specifically, after a favorable earnings 
surprise, they should avoid selling immediately before quarterly earnings announcements in 
quarters +1, +2, and +3 after the initial earnings announcement and instead delay selling to after 
each announcement.  Furthermore, sophisticated investors should also accelerate any planned 
purchases so that they are made immediately before quarterly earnings announcements in 
quarters +1, +2, and +3, rather than waiting until after.  If sophisticated arbitrageurs follow this 
strategy, then for markets to clear, the unsophisticated investors who are driving the mispricing 
must display an opposite trading pattern.  Thus, to explore further whether individual investors 
are driving PEAD, we also examine investor trades in the days surrounding subsequent earnings 
announcements conditional on an initial earnings surprise. Examining these trades can also 






Table 7 addresses this issue.  The column labeled Qtr 0 reports trading behavior 
following the initial earnings announcement.  Panel A (B) reports slope coefficients and t-
statistics from separate regressions of buys, sells, and net purchases on an indicator variable set 
equal to 1 for SUE 10 (SUE 1) firms and to 0 for firms in SUE 5 and SUE 6 (i.e, for those with 
little or no earnings surprise).  In the 25-day window subsequent to the earnings surprise, there is 
significant buying and selling after both good and bad news (relative to the medium news 
category).  Furthermore, net purchases are generally significantly different from zero after both 
good and bad news, and net buying is larger, more significant, and more persistent after bad 
news.
21   
Put Table 7 about here. 
The later columns of Table 7 describe the trading around earnings announcements made 
in the four quarters subsequent to the initial earnings announcement (i.e., in quarters Qtr +1, Qtr 
+2, Qtr +3, and Qtr +4).  Panel A shows that after a favorable earnings surprise, the number of 
shares both purchased and sold are unusually high and strongly significant in the 10 days 
preceding and the 25 days following later quarterly earnings announcements, and Panel B shows 
that a similar pattern obtains after unfavorable surprises.  Thus, extreme earnings surprises 
trigger trading activity not only near the time of the announcement, but in the days surrounding 
later quarterly earnings announcements.  This is consistent with rational trading based upon 
information, or with an attention effect over a long horizon. 
                                                 
21 There is significant net buying following bad news in each of the windows [+1, +5], [+6, +15], and [+16, +25].  
On the other hand, following good news, there is strongly significant net buying only in window [+6, +15], weakly 
significant net buying in window [+1, +5], and weakly significant net selling in window [+16, +25].  The early net 




Turning to net purchases, conditional on good earnings news, net buying is significantly 
positive in the window [-1, -10] prior to the next three quarterly earnings announcements (i.e., 
Qtrs +1 to +3).  This is not consistent with the hypothesis that individuals are naively driving the 
concentration of upside drift at later earnings announcement dates.  Rather, this evidence is 
consistent with individual investors being sophisticated enough to accelerate buying to right 
before rather than right after the earnings announcement.  However, we also find evidence (not 
reported in the table) of high net buying (t = 2.05) by individuals in the two days immediately 
following the next quarterly earnings announcement (Qtr +1), which is not supportive of this 
kind of sophistication.
22   In summary, this evidence does not give any clear indication that 
individuals are systematically trading in a way that would cause a concentration of drift on later 
quarterly earnings announcement dates.  Nor does the evidence support the opposite hypothesis, 
that individual investors profit by systematically trading in a sophisticated fashion (i.e., by 
exploiting the drift at later earnings announcement dates). 
Panel B of table 7 is especially relevant for our main hypothesis since drift is stronger 
after bad news.  This panel reveals significant net buying in the 5 days subsequent to the earnings 
announcement in Qtr +1 following bad news, and some indication of further buying in days [+6, 
+15] and [+16, +25].  This suggests sophisticated behavior because by delaying net purchases to 
a few days after the announcement, individuals are able to avoid the concentration of downward 
drift on the Qtr +1 earnings announcement date.   
There is no sign of such sophisticated behavior with respect to Qtr +2, but some possible 
indication with respect to Qtr +3 (with insignificant net selling prior to the announcement, and 
                                                 
22 While the hypothesis that individuals drive PEAD makes no prediction for Qtr +4 (since there is little drift in the 
fourth quarter), our analysis reveals that, conditional on an unfavorable earnings surprise, there is significant net 
selling (t = -2.64) in the window [-1, -10] prior to the earnings announcement a year later (Qtr +4).    27
 
 
significant buying in the window  [+16, +25]).  These results provide no support for the 
hypothesis that individual trading drives the concentration of downside drift after bad news at the 
subsequent three earnings announcement dates.  In fact, these results provide limited support for 
the alternative hypothesis that individuals are sophisticated exploiters of downside PEAD.  
However, there is also significant net selling in the 10 days prior to the Qtr +4 earnings 
announcement, and significant net buying in days [+6, +15], a pattern somewhat similar to that 
in Qtr +3.  Since drift has virtually dissipated by Qtr +4, this disagrees with the interpretation 
that such trading patterns are intended to exploit drift.
23 
Taking the evidence as a whole (conditioned on either good or bad news), there is no 
indication that individuals are systematically engaging in a form of trading that would be 
expected if individual investor errors were the source of the concentration of drift at later 
quarterly earnings announcement dates.  If anything, there is a rather modest indication that 
individuals are acting as sophisticated arbitrageurs to exploit PEAD.   
 The evidence after bad news is, however, broadly suggestive of some psychological 
stories. After initial bad news about earnings, individuals are net buyers, which could reflect an 
attention effect coupled with a disposition effect; or a bias in self-attribution (an insistence on 
interpreting new information as supportive of the self and past judgments (see, e.g., Langer and 
Roth 1975)).  Further purchases after earnings announcements in subsequent quarters could 
reflect similar biases. 
 
                                                 
23 The evidence from other windows hints at a broader regularity of selling in the days prior to subsequent earnings 
announcements and buying in the days after these announcements.  In Qtr t+1, there is significant net buying in 
window [+1, +5] and insignificant buying in windows [+6, +15] and [+16, +25].  In Qtr +2, there is insignificant 
selling in window [-1, -10], though no suggestion of significant buying subsequent to the announcement.  In Qtr +3, 
there is insignificant selling in window [-1, -10] and significant buying in window [+6, +15].  Furthermore, in Qtr 
+4, there is significant selling in window  [-1, -10] and significant buying in window [+6, +15].  Finally, there is 
significant selling during all subsequent quarters in window [-1, -2].      28
 
 
Investor classes based on affluence and trading frequency 
We next consider whether trading effects are concentrated in the classes of investors for 
which we might expect naïve trading to be most likely to occur.  More affluent investors and/or 
more active traders are more likely to be experienced in stock market trading.  It is therefore 
possible that they are more sophisticated in their trading.  This suggests that they may be better at 
avoiding errors in trading in response to earnings announcements, or may even be good at 
exploiting drift.   
Panel A (Panel B) of table 8 tests whether net purchases are significantly different for 
extreme good news (bad news) and non-news earnings announcements for three different classes 
of investors (affluent investors, active traders, and general investors).  The table also examines 
the reaction to subsequent earnings announcements for each of these investor classes.
24   
Put Table 8 about here. 
For affluent investors, favorable earnings news is associated with a general tendency 
toward net selling after subsequent quarterly earnings announcements.  Furthermore, affluent 
investors are generally net buyers before subsequent earnings announcements but again, these 
results are frequently not significant.  While this pattern is consistent with sophisticated 
exploitation of the concentration of drift at subsequent earnings announcements, this buying and 
selling is frequently not significant.  Furthermore, there is significant net buying prior to the 
earnings announcement in Qtr +4, even though there is no positive drift on average associated 
with the fourth quarterly earnings announcement after the initial surprise.  Finally, the (uniform 
                                                 




but insignificant) net selling after the initial earnings surprise by affluent investors does not 
exploit drift. 
For the general class of individuals (i.e., individuals who are not affluent and are not 
active traders), few results are significant.  However (not reported in the table) we find that in 
Qtr +4 after the initial surprise, there is marginally significant net selling both on the date of the 
one-year-later earnings announcement, and on the two days after.  While we do not wish to 
overemphasize what could be randomly significant coefficients, it is worth noting that a similar 
but more significant one-year-later net selling effect exists for the active traders. 
  The most interesting effects are found for active traders.  Active traders are significant 
net buyers in the first 15 days after the initial positive earnings surprise and are insignificant net 
buyers in the majority of windows in the remaining quarters.
25  Such buying after subsequent 
earnings announcements is ill-suited for exploiting the drift concentrated at these 
announcements.  However, the significant buying in the 10 days prior to earnings 
announcements in Qtr +1 to +3 is consistent with sophisticated trading.  Thus, the pattern of 
trading by active traders does not seem to be either closely aligned with, or unambiguously 
opposed to exploiting the drift.  Rather, Qtrs +2 and +3 seem to reveal an overall tendency 
toward net purchases in the days preceding and following these earnings announcements.  This is 
consistent with an attention effect.  
  In summary, the evidence on investor trading does not clearly indicate that any of the 
classes are systematically trading so as to generate the concentration of the drift at subsequent 
earnings announcement dates.  Thus, the evidence does not lend support to the hypothesis that 
individual investors drive PEAD.    
                                                 
25 Although not significant in any of the windows presented, the effect is significant over the entire [+1, +25] day 
window in the second quarter.    30
 
 
  In addition, there is no clear indication that any investor class is systematically exploiting 
the concentration of the drift at subsequent earnings announcement dates.  Thus, there is also no 
clear support for the opposite hypothesis that individual investors are trading in ways that 
arbitrage away the drift.  The evidence does, however, support the existence of attention effects. 
Panel B of table 8 describes the net purchases by investor class at an initial bad news 
earnings announcement and at earnings announcements following the initial bad news.  In the 25 
days immediately following bad earnings news, the volume of cumulative net purchases is 
positive and growing for all classes, but the volume of net purchases after day +5 is relatively 
modest for affluent traders.  This evidence, taken in isolation, suggests that affluent individuals 
may be more sophisticated and therefore less prone to buying heavily into a negative expected 
drift.  However, after good earnings news, affluent investors are the only class who are net 
sellers (i.e., after good news, affluent investors trade against the drift) which does not seem 
sophisticated.   
In summary, the evidence subsequent to bad news announcements does not support the 
hypothesis that any of these individual investor classes drive the concentration of PEAD at later 
earnings announcement dates.  Nor does it support the hypothesis that any of these individual 
investor classes are systematically trading to exploit the concentration of drift.  
As a further test (not reported here),  we have partitioned investors into three classes 
based on the gender and marital status of the head of the household (as described briefly in 
Section IV).  In brief,  there is no indication that any of the classes are driving the concentration 





This paper examines whether trading by individual investors drives post-earnings 
announcement drift, and describes how individual investors trade conditional on extreme 
earnings surprises.  At a broad level, several regularities are of interest.  First, the ability of 
individual trades to predict future returns (Odean 1999) extends to trades taken in response to 
extreme earnings surprises, and this effect is not subsumed by PEAD.  Second, the evidence is 
consistent with an earnings attention effect: extreme earnings surprises trigger greater trading 
and greater net buying.  Third, abnormal trading is stronger for negative earnings surprises than 
for positive earnings surprises.  Fourth, in the first 17 trading days after an extreme earnings 
surprise, net buying is fairly similar regardless of whether the surprise is good news or bad news, 
but starting on day +18, net buying after bad news significantly exceeds net buying after good 
news.   
Turning to the main question of the paper, we find no evidence in our sample that trading 
by individual investors following extreme earnings surprises causes post-earnings announcement 
drift.  Such trading would need to restrain the efficient adjustment of market prices to earnings 
surprises. In other words, if individuals were causing PEAD, they would engage in earnings-
contrarian trading, buying aggressively after adverse earnings news and selling after favorable 
news.  However, individuals are strongly significant net buyers in first three weeks following 
both favorable and unfavorable earnings surprises.  Furthermore, while we find that net buying 
by individual investors in the five days following an extreme earnings surprise is a significant 
negative predictor of future abnormal returns, these returns are unrelated to PEAD. 
  Our tests provide clear evidence that in our dataset individual investors are not the source 
of PEAD.  If trading by individuals were the source of PEAD, then net purchases made by  32
 
 
individual investors following an initial earnings announcement would be able to subsume part 
or all of the ability of the earnings surprise to predict subsequent abnormal returns.  However, 
this is not the case.  Although individual trades are a significant predictor of future stock returns, 
including ranked net purchases in a regression of SUE on abnormal returns does not weaken the 
predictive power of the earnings surprise at all.  Nor does including the earnings surprise weaken 
the predictive power of individual trades.  Thus, two distinct market inefficiencies seem to exist.  
The first is PEAD.  The second is that, the ranked net purchases made by individual investors in 
reaction to extreme earnings surprise are negative predictors of future abnormal returns.  Finally, 
analysis by investor class suggests that high-capital investors are less ‘skilled’ at picking losers 
following unusual extreme earnings surprises, that ranked net purchases made by general 
investors following unusual extreme earnings surprises are stronger predictors of negative future 
returns, and that this effect is strongest for actively-trading investors.  
  Because PEAD is especially strong at the time of the next three quarterly earnings 
announcements, following extreme negative earnings surprises, smart arbitrageurs should time 
their buying to be immediately after subsequent earnings announcements rather than 
immediately before, and time their selling to be immediately before rather than immediately 
after.  If individual investors are naïve with respect to the concentration of PEAD at subsequent 
earnings announcements and are thereby impeding price adjustement, we expect them to be 
making opposing trades.  Thus, a further prediction of the hypothesis is that given a very 
unfavorable earnings surprise, individual investors will be net buyers immediately preceding the 
next three earnings announcements, and will be net sellers immediately following.  The 
evidence, however, does not confirm such a pattern either for individuals as a group, or for 
subclasses based upon affluence, frequency of trading, gender, or marital status.  33
 
 
There are some limitations to the tests we perform.  Although the number of data points 
in the sample is large, it includes only those individuals who use a single major brokerage firm 
over a six-year period.  Other groups of individuals may behave differently, and it is conceivable 
that the behavior of individuals during this time period was for some reason anomalous.  
Furthermore, there may be further sub-categories of individuals who cannot be identified using 
the category information of the dataset, but who may behave differently.   
In summary, there is a clear answer to the question posed in the title of this paper.  In our 
dataset, there is no indication that trading by the individual investors drives post-earnings 
announcement drift.  What, then, is the source of PEAD?  There are several possibilities.  One is 
that the effect is a spurious consequence of some sort of measurement problem, such as the 
imperfect measurement of risk.  A second is that individuals drive PEAD in a way that is not 
identifiable using our dataset.  For example, some sub-category of individuals whose 
membership is unrelated to affluence or frequency of trading may be naive with respect to 
earnings announcements.  Finally, it is possible that some subset of institutional investors 
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SUE 10 minus SUE 5 & 6 SUE 1 minus SUE 5 & 6
 
 
SUE 1 firms are firms with the most negative random walk earnings surprise, SUE 10 firms are firms with 
the most positive random walk earnings surprise, and SUE 5 & 6 firms are firms with the smallest random 
walk earnings surprise (in absolute value). 
Net purchases is measured as the number of shares purchased minus the number of shares sold, scaled by 






Panel A: Average Trade Size in Dollars (Shares) 
   $  Trade  Size   
Year  Buy/Sell  Mean Quintile  1  Median Quintile  3  Trades 
1991  Buy $9,654 $2,213 $4,425 $9,325  197,277 
   (653) (100) (200) (500)   
1991  Sell  $12,399 $2,500 $5,200  $11,563  144,156 
   (720) (100) (250) (700)   
1992  Buy  $10,244 $2,388 $4,688 $9,625  186,819 
   (645) (100) (200) (500)   
1992  Sell  $12,957 $2,550 $5,400  $12,000  141,101 
   (753) (100) (255) (800)   
1993  Buy  $10,381 $2,500 $4,838  $10,000  181,008 
   (700) (100) (200) (600)   
1993  Sell  $12,385 $2,625 $5,450  $12,050  155,292 
   (710) (100) (250) (700)   
1994  Buy  $10,542 $2,475 $4,863  $10,250  152,609 
   (695) (100) (250) (700)   
1994  Sell  $12,508 $2,539 $5,500  $12,375  128,072 
   (713) (100) (300) (702)   
1995  Buy  $12,942 $2,788 $5,625  $12,125  178,391 
   (689) (100) (225) (700)   
1995  Sell  $14,961 $2,800 $6,125  $14,325  160,005 
   (716) (100) (296) (800)   
1996  Buy  $13,495 $2,900 $5,700  $12,750  186,003 
   (700) (100) (200) (700)   
1996  Sell  $16,554 $3,113 $6,768  $16,050  158,968 
   (727) (100) (300) (800)   
 
Panel B: Average $ Volume (Number) of Trades Per Investor Year by Investor Class 
Investor  Type  Mean Q1  Median Q3 
Number of 
Investor-years 
All  Investors  $125,503  $7,416 $21,256 $67,767 275,062 
  (10.34) (1) (4)  (10)   
High-Capital 
Investors  $105,623 $13,984 $38,841  $101,975  52,482 
  (8.60) (2) (5)  (11)   
General  
Investors  $52,220  $5,563 $14,428 $37,700 189,512 
  (6.15) (1) (3) (7)   
Actively-Trading 
Investors  $577,042  $51,039 $158,276 $449,038  33,068 
  (38.65)  (8) (22) (46)   
 
All trades of common shares made by investors from January 1991 to December 1996 inclusive.  In panel 
A the unit of measurement is a single trade by any investor.  In panel B the unit of measurement is a year of 
trading activity by a single investor. 
 
 




Abnormal Trading Following Extreme Earnings Surprises – All Firms 
 
Panel A: Good News (SUE 10) Firms Vs. No News (SUE 5 and 6) Firms 
N = 20,022 firm-quarters  Buys  Sells  Net Purchases
days +1 to +5  23.730 19.271  4.458
 (10.98) (11.22)  (1.86)
days +6 to +15  24.329 16.897  7.431
 (11.23) (  8.40)  (2.94)
 
Panel B: Bad News (SUE 1) Firms Vs. No News (SUE 5 and 6) Firms 
N = 20,019 firm-quarters  Buys  Sells  Net Purchases
days +1 to +5  11.984 6.337  5.646 
 (7.42) (5.89)  (3.18) 
days +6 to +15  20.141 10.856  9.285 
 (8.87) (5.38)  (3.46) 
 
Mean difference and (t-statistics) between extreme earnings surprise firms and no earnings surprise firms.  
Panel A (B) tests the mean number of shares traded of SUE 10 (SUE 1) firms against the mean number of 
shares traded of SUE 5 and 6 firms in the days immediately following the earnings announcements.  Shares 
traded are scaled by millions of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is 




Abnormal Trading Following Extreme Earnings Surprises – Small Firms 
 
Panel A: Good News (SUE 10) Firms Vs. No News (SUE 5 and 6) Firms  
N = 6,797 firm-quarters  Buys  Sells  Net Purchases
days +1 to +5  17.506 14.229  3.277
 (3.21) (3.27)  (0.54)
days +6 to +15  8.137 -1.504  9.640
 (1.96) (-0.29)  (1.62)
 
Panel B: Bad News (SUE 1) Firms Vs. No News (SUE 5 and 6) Firms 
N = 6,803 firm-quarters  Buys  Sells  Net Purchases
days +1 to +5  5.575 -2.057  7.632
 (1.33) (-0.69)  (1.59)
days +6 to +15  8.890 -5.401  14.29
 (1.64) (-1.06)  (2.04)
 
Mean difference and (t-statistics) between extreme earnings surprise firms and no surprise firms.  Panel A 
Panel A (B) tests the mean number of shares traded of SUE 10 (SUE 1) firms against the mean number of 
shares traded of SUE 5 and 6 firms in the days immediately following the earnings announcements. Shares 
traded are scaled by millions of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is 
announced.  
 




Net Purchases by Investor Class 
 








N = Firm-quarters  18,121  13,902  17,504
days +1 to +5  1.159 -0.078  4.397
 (0.67) (-0.11)  (2.29)
days +6 to +15  3.037 -0.820  6.931
 (2.20) (-1.02)  (3.06)
 








N = Firm-quarters  18,125  13,902  17,504
days +1 to +5  1.527 3.022  1.141
 (1.46) (3.70)  (0.66)
days +6 to +15  3.691 0.962  5.956
 (1.64) (1.02)  (3.26)
 
 
Coefficients and t-statistics (below in parentheses) from a regression of net purchases on an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for firms with extreme earnings surprise and 0 for firms with little or no earnings 
surprise, and a measure of market-wide trading.   
Net purchases is measured as the number of shares purchased minus the number of shares sold in the 
window, divided by millions of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is 
announced. 
 
Extreme earnings surprise is defined as SUE 10 firms in panel A (good news firms) and SUE 1 firms in 




Regressions of Abnormal Returns on Ranks of Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
(SUE), Market-To-Book (MTB), Size (MVE), RANK NET PURCHASES, and 
Momentum For All Investors 
 
N = 10,932 
Returns 




9 Months  0.092  0.011 -0.010 -0.010    1.22%
 (6.65)  (7.97) (-5.88) (-5.60)     
 0.114  0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.005  1.28%
 (7.16)  (8.01) (-5.74) (-5.79) (-2.77)   
 0.090  0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.005 0.005 1.37%
 (5.12)  (8.01) (-5.71) (-5.85) (-2.73) (3.25) 
6 Months  0.048  0.009 -0.004 -0.008    1.15%
 (4.52)  (8.96) (-3.45) (-5.50)     
 0.063  0.009 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003  1.20%
 (5.21)  (9.00) (-3.32) (-5.68) (-2.58)   
 0.047  0.009 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 0.004 1.26%
 (3.51)  (9.00) (-3.29) (-5.73) (-2.54) (2.86) 
The sample size is measured in firm-quarters.   
SUE includes those 11,480 firms with non-zero net buys in the 5 days following the earnings 
announcement and SUEs in deciles 1 to 3 or 8 to 10. 
MTB is the decile rank of the firm’s market-to-book ratio. 
MVE is the decile rank of the firm’s market value of equity. 
RANK NET PURCHASES is calculated as the number of shares purchased minus the number of shares 
sold from day +1 to day +5 relative to the earnings announcement date, scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is announced.   
Momentum is market-adjusted buy and hold returns for the 6 months prior to the earnings announcement 
date. 
Abnormal returns are calculated as the buy and hold returns that begin on day +6 and end 6 or 9 months 
later (where a month is defined as 21 trading days) minus the buy and hold value-weighted market returns 




Regressions of Abnormal Returns on Ranks of Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
(SUE), Market-To-Book (MTB), Size (MVE), RANK NET PURCHASES, and 
Momentum by Investor Classes 
 
General Investors    N = 6,999 firm-quarters  
Returns 




9 Months  0.076  0.011 -0.011 -0.006    1.10%
 (4.55)  (6.59) (-5.11) (-3.10)     
 0.099  0.011 -0.010 -0.007 -0.005  1.17%
 (5.16)  (6.58) (-4.98) (-3.26) (-2.44)   
 0.079  0.011 -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 0.004 1.23%
 (3.74)  (6.56) (-4.95) (-3.31) (-2.42) (2.27) 
6 Months  0.051  0.009 -0.006 -0.007    1.04%
 (3.96)  (6.68) (-3.47) (-4.06)     
 0.066  0.009 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003  1.09%
 (4.46)  (6.67) (-3.36) (-4.19) (-2.04)   
 0.047  0.009 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 0.004 1.18%
 (2.89)  (6.66) (-3.31) (-4.26) (-2.02) (2.77) 
 
High-Capital Investors  N = 3,246 firm-quarters 
Returns 




9 Months  0.118  0.007 -0.010 -0.010    0.88%
 (4.58)  (2.97) (-3.27) (-3.18)     
 0.136  0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004  0.90%
 (4.58)  (2.89) (-3.12) (-3.34) (-1.23)   
 0.113  0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 0.005 0.97%
 (3.51)  (2.88) (-3.08) (-3.41) (-1.23) (1.85) 
6 Months  0.040  0.006 -0.003 -0.005    0.46%
 (2.10)  (3.27) (-1.34) (-2.22)     
 0.051  0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002  0.45%
 (2.28)  (3.20) (-1.23) (-2.35) (-0.92)   
 0.037  0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 0.49%





Actively-Trading Investors    N = 7,016 firm-quarters 
Returns 




9 Months  0.108  0.008 -0.011 -0.008    0.89%
 (5.95)  (4.73) (-5.04) (-3.70)     
 0.137  0.008 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006  1.00%
 (6.65)  (4.89) (-4.97) (-3.94) (-2.96)   
 0.108  0.008 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 0.006 1.12%
 (4.82)  (4.89) (-4.96) (-4.01) (-2.90) (3.16) 
6 Months  0.054  0.007 -0.006 -0.005    0.76%
 (3.86)  (5.68) (-3.32) (-3.23)     
 0.072  0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004  0.84%
 (4.59)  (5.82) (-3.27) (-3.43) (-2.51)   
 0.052  0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 0.005 0.94%
 (3.02)  (5.82) (-3.25) (-3.49) (-2.46) (2.95) 
 
The sample sizes are measured in firm-quarters.   
SUE includes those 11,480 firms with non-zero net buys in the 5 days following the earnings 
announcement and SUEs in deciles 1 to 3 or 8 to 10. 
MTB is the decile rank of the firm’s market-to-book ratio. 
MVE is the decile rank of the firm’s market value of equity. 
RANK NET PURCHASES is calculated as the number of shares purchased minus the number of shares 
sold from day +1 to day +5 relative to the earnings announcement date, scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is announced.   
Momentum is market-adjusted buy and hold returns for the 6 months prior to the earnings announcement 
date. 
Abnormal returns are calculated as the buy and hold returns that begin on day +6 and end 6 or 9 months 
later (where a month is defined as 21 trading days) minus the buy and hold value-weighted market returns 
for the same period. 
 




Regressions of buys, sells, and net purchases on SUE indicators 
 
Panel A: Good news firms (SUE 10) vs. No news firms (SUE 5 & 6) 
N=20,022 (firm-quarters)  Qtr 0 Qtr +1 Qtr +2 Qtr +3  Qtr +4
Buys days –1 to –10  23.832 29.901 30.218 27.859
  (9.05) (11.06) (10.41) (10.22)
Buys days +1 to +5  23.730 18.889 23.464 26.373 22.745
  (10.98) (11.87) (9.49) (9.92) (9.44)
Buys days +6 to +15  24.329 20.842 28.007 26.844 24.858
  (11.23) (10.98) (10.66) (12.33) (9.31)
Buys days +16 to +25  22.574 24.303 29.086 25.936 15.507
  (11.25) (12.82) (12.45) (10.32) (8.71)
Sells days –1 to –10  18.345 25.035 24.243 25.787
  (8.43) (9.98) (10.38) (9.88)
Sells days +1 to +5  19.271 17.986 19.738 21.702 21.724
  (11.22) (8.53) (9.31) (9.61) (9.45)
Sells days +6 to +15  16.897 21.913 23.313 25.272 21.598
  ( 8.40) (10.84) (9.83) (10.46)  (8.38)
Sells days +16 to +25  26.164 26.098 28.443 25.320 11.640
  (10.50) (12.81) (11.23) (10.42) (7.10)
Net purchases days –1 to –10    5.488 4.866 5.976 2.072
  (1.90) (1.66) (1.90) (0.68)
Net purchases days +1 to +5  4.458 0.902 3.726 4.671 1.021
  (1.86) (0.38) (1.22) (1.52) (0.34)
Net purchases days +6 to +15  7.431 -1.071 4.694 1.572 3.260
  (2.94) (-0.46) (1.55) (0.59) (1.08)
Net purchases days +16 to +25  -3.590 -1.795 0.643 0.617 3.867
  (-1.52) (-0.77) (0.24) (0.21) (2.00)
 
Coefficients and t-statistics below in parentheses from a regression of various measures of trading on an 
indicator variable set equal to 1 for firms in SUE 10 and set equal to 0 for firms in SUE 5 and 6. 
 
The first column measures trading around the current earnings announcement (quarter 0) and the following 
four columns measure trading around the following four earnings announcements (quarters +1 through +4).   
Buys are measured as the number of shares purchased in the window, divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is announced.   
Sells are measured as the number of shares sold in the window, divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is announced.   
Net purchases is measured as the number of shares purchased minus the number of shares sold in the 




Panel B: Bad news firms (SUE 1) vs. No news firms (SUE 5 & 6) 
N=20,019 (firm-quarters)  Qtr 0 Qtr +1 Qtr +2 Qtr +3  Qtr +4
Buys days –1 to –10  13.752  11.684  14.307   12.333
  (6.59) (6.11) (6.27) (5.57)
Buys days +1 to +5  11.984  10.344  9.224   8.942   8.384
  (7.42) (5.54) (5.05) (4.15) (4.98)
Buys days +6 to +15  20.141  16.832 18.506  21.358   19.321
  (8.87) (6.92) (7.49) (7.69) (7.06)
Buys days +16 to +25    19.583  18.105  18.786  14.794    7.546
  (9.27) (8.19) (7.20) (6.35) (6.37)
Sells days –1 to –10   12.877 14.208 18.108   18.388
  (5.82) (6.72) (7.76) (8.14)
Sells days +1 to +5  6.337   5.147   10.314   9.683   10.180
  (5.89) (3.72) (6.53) (6.28) (6.08)
Sells days +6 to +15  10.856  12.168 18.813  12.916   12.637
  (5.38) (6.39) (6.30) (4.91) (4.55)
Sells days +16 to +25  11.157   16.749 17.832  15.973    7.800
  (6.16) (8.33) (8.05) (7.46) (5.40)
Net purchases days –1 to –10   0.875 -2.524 -3.800 -6.055
  (0.35) (-1.05) (-1.46) (-2.64)
Net purchases days +1 to +5  5.646 5.197  -1.090 -0.742 -1.796
  (3.18) (2.66)  (-0.48) (-0.30) (-0.85)
Net purchases days +6 to +15  9.285 4.665  -0.307  8.442   6.684 
  (3.46) (1.65)  (-0.10) (2.52) (1.92) 
Net purchases days +16 to +25  8.425 1.356    0.954  -1.179 -0.254
   (3.41) ( 0.51)  (0.34)  (-0.43) (-0.16)
 
Coefficients and t-statistics below in parentheses from a regression of various measures of trading on an 
indicator variable set equal to 1 for firms in SUE 1 and set equal to 0 for firms in SUE 5 and 6. 
 
The first column measures trading around the current earnings announcement (quarter 0) and the following 
four columns measure trading around the following four earnings announcements (quarters +1 through +4).   
Buys are measured as the number of shares purchased in the window, divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is announced.   
Sells are measured as the number of shares sold in the window, divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is announced.   
Net purchases is measured as the number of shares purchased minus the number of shares sold in the 





Net purchases by affluence / trading frequency classes  
at the initial earnings announcement  
and at subsequent earnings announcements 
 
Panel A: Good news firms (SUE 10) vs. No news firms (SUE 5 & 6) 
  Qtr 0 Qtr +1 Qtr +2 Qtr +3  Qtr +4
Affluent N=13,902 
Net purchases days –1 to –10   0.216 1.255 3.899  2.354
   (0.19) (1.07) (2.91)  (2.33)
Net purchases days +1 to +5  -0.078 -0.242 1.667 -1.226  0.197
  (-0.11) (-0.25) (1.10) (-1.18)  (0.17)
Net purchases days +6 to +15  -0.820 -1.137 -0.712 -1.093 -0.009
  (-1.02) (-1.30) (-0.65) (-0.94) (-0.01)
Net purchases days +16 to +25  -1.247 -1.944 -1.628 -0.614 -1.049
  (-1.43) (-2.18) (-1.47) (-0.62) (-1.64)
General N=18,121                
Net purchases days –1 to –10   2.165 -1.413 -0.703  0.825
   (1.10) (-0.90) (-0.31)  (0.44)
Net purchases days +1 to +5  1.159 0.687 1.705 4.132 0.395
  (0.67) (0.54) (0.77) (1.79) (0.22)
Net purchases days +6 to +15  3.037 -0.253 1.603 1.295  -1.898
  (2.20) (-0.20) (0.77) (0.94)  (-1.31)
Net purchases days +16 to +25  -3.011 -0.310 -0.779 0.817  -0.611
  (-2.04) (-0.22) (-0.46) (0.56)  (-0.69)
Active traders N=17,504      
Net purchases days –1 to –10     4.227 7.352 5.398  0.269
     (1.85) (2.73) (2.30)  (0.10)
Net purchases days +1 to +5  4.397 -0.347 1.212 1.520 0.806
  (2.29) (-0.15) (0.53) (0.64) (0.30)
Net purchases days +6 to +15  6.931 0.550 4.042 1.955 6.201
  (3.06) (0.26) (1.57) (0.78) (2.18)
Net purchases days +16 to +25  -0.751 1.167 3.103 0.227 5.030




Panel B: Bad news firms (SUE 1) vs. No news firms (SUE 5 & 6) 
  Qtr 0 Qtr +1 Qtr +2 Qtr +3  Qtr +4
Affluent N=13,902 
Net purchases days –1 to –10   1.978 0.827 -1.464 -2.541
   (1.84) (0.83) (-1.24) (-2.44)
Net purchases days +1 to +5  3.022 2.143 0.410 1.842 1.279
  (3.70) (2.39) (0.54) (1.41) (1.13)
Net purchases days +6 to +15  0.962 -0.336 0.596 0.714 2.313
  (1.02) (-0.40) (0.52) (0.68) (1.77)
Net purchases days +16 to +25  0.867 0.544 -0.588 -2.465 -2.166
  (0.79) (0.54) (-0.64) (-2.44) (-2.24)
General N=18,125             
Net purchases days –1 to –10    -2.890 -2.057 -2.471 -2.630
    (-1.84) (-1.57) (-1.40) (-2.18)
Net purchases days +1 to +5  1.527 1.166 -0.190 -2.898 -0.330
  (1.46) (0.98) (-0.16) (-2.56) (-0.29)
Net purchases days +6 to +15  3.691 2.738 -0.498 3.439  -1.139
  (1.64) (1.32) (-0.25) (1.35)  (-0.44)
Net purchases days +16 to +25  4.618 1.158 1.283 1.269  -1.036
  (2.81) (0.71) (0.77) (0.80)  (-1.23)
Active traders N=17,504             
Net purchases days –1 to –10   3.096 -1.884 -0.582 -2.898
   (1.48) (-0.86) (-0.28) (-1.43)
Net purchases days +1 to +5  1.141 3.396 -1.114 0.134  -1.983
  (0.66) (1.97) (-0.52) (0.06)  (-1.05)
Net purchases days +6 to +15  5.956 3.628 0.138 5.049 7.127
  (3.26) (1.53) (0.06) (1.99) (2.75)
Net purchases days +16 to +25  5.162 -0.382 -0.947 -2.248 2.452
  (2.56) (-0.16) (-0.38) (-0.90) (1.74)
 
Coefficients and t-statistics below in parentheses from a regression of net purchases on an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for firms with extreme earnings surprise and 0 for firms with little earnings surprise, and 
a measure of market-wide trading.   
Net purchases is measured as the number of shares purchased minus the number of shares sold in the 
window, divided by the number shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings is 
announced. 
Extreme earnings surprise is defined as SUE 10 firms in panel A (good news firms) and SUE 1 firms in 
panel B (bad news firms).  Little earnings surprise is defined as SUE 5 and SUE 6 firms.   